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by César Pintado
9/10/2009
This is an extraction of an uncopyrighted work, The reserve policies of nations: a comparative analysis, by Richard Weitz and published by the Strategic Studies Institute. You can read the full text in http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/.
The Japanese Self-Defense Force (SDF) is currently in a state of flux.
Seeking to manage the new threats of the 21st century and remain interoperable with the U.S. military, the SDF is becoming more agile and technologically advanced. As part of this process, the SDF reserve components are undergoing a comprehensive transformation.
During the Cold War, the United States assumed complete responsibility for defending Japan against external threats. Japanese decisionmakers did not anticipate mobilizing their military reserves except in a national emergency, most likely a full-scale invasion of the homeland.
Since Japanese military planners considered this scenario implausible, they regularly underfunded, undertrained, and perhaps underutilized their reserve forces. Sporadic training, low compensation, and a weak officer cadre further relegated the SDF’s reserve components to the periphery of the Japanese defense establishment. During the last decade, however, the changing nature of both the general international security environment and the specific threats to Japan has led the government to restructure and reinvigorate the SDF reserve components.
Since Japan’s frustrating experience during the 1991 Persian Gulf War when Tokyo’s multi-billion dollar assistance package yielded only disparaging comments about “checkbook diplomacy,” Japanese leaders have gradually expanded their involvement in international security issues. In June 1992, the Japanese Diet passed the International Peace Cooperation Law authorizing the SDF to participate in UN peacekeeping and international humanitarian relief operations under certain conditions. The Japanese military subsequently contributed to noncombatant UN missions in Cambodia, Rwanda, East Timor, and other post-conflict regions. Following Japan’s uncertain response in 1994 to a U.S. request for assistance during a possible confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear weapons program, Tokyo and Washington in 1997 announced revisions to the Guidelines for U.S.- Japan Defense Cooperation. Among other things, the modifications specified that Japan would provide “rear area support” and “operational cooperation” (e.g., intelligence gathering, surveillance, and minesweeping) for American forces “in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security.”
The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of October 2001, renewed in subsequent years, enabled the SDF to dispatch warships to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support (primarily at-sea refueling) for allied military operations in Afghanistan as part of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.221 It marked the first SDF deployment in a theater of war. The Iraq Humanitarian Reconstruction Support Special Measures Law of July 2003 permitted the government to deploy ground troops in Iraq to provide logistical support for the allied military campaign there. The SDF contingent that served in Iraq from January 2004 until July 2006 represented the largest and most dangerous overseas Japanese military operation since World War II.
Besides describing China and North Korea as potential threats, Japan’s December
2004 National Defense Program Guidelines stressed the need to improve the country’s ability to conduct joint military operations with the United States in additional areas. In February 2005, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) cited “the need to continue examining the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan’s Self Defense Forces and the U.S. Armed Forces required to respond effectively to diverse challenges in a well-coordinated manner.” A few months later, Japanese forces participated for the first time in the Cobra Gold military exercise with the United States, Thailand, and Singapore.223 With 240,000 troops, extensive air and naval power, and a $50-billion annual budget, the SDF could provide key assistance to an overtaxed U.S. military in certain East Asian contingencies.
The ruling Liberal Democratic Party has been pushing to modify the traditional Japanese interpretation of their post-war constitution, especially Article 9’s perceived restrictions on Japan’s contribution to collective self-defense activities, to allow the SDF to play a greater role in improving the international security environment. Amending the constitution would require a two-thirds majority vote in both houses of the Diet, as well as an affirmative majority in a subsequent national referendum. Although this political process could take years, Japan’s external security role will likely continue to expand on a less formal basis as long as the public continues to feel threatened. Alarm over menacing North Korean behavior initially motivated many of the changes in Japan’s regional security policies, but growing concern over China has substantially lessened traditional public apprehensions about expanding the SDF’s roles and capabilities. A December 2005 public opinion poll conducted by the Nikkei Shimbun found that 69 percent of respondents said people “cannot trust” China, compared with only 14 percent who said China could be trusted. Only 35 percent of the 904 people polled said they could not trust the United States.
Although the Japanese continue to see China as replete with commercial opportunities, recent Chinese actions have alarmed Japan’s leaders and public alike. During the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, China launched missiles in the island’s vicinity, threatening regional maritime commerce. Some of the missiles landed less than 100 kilometers from Okinawa. Only a few months later, the sovereignty dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands revived. Since the late 1990s, Chinese ships have conducted unauthorized “research” within waters claimed by Japan, exacerbating their bilateral dispute over exploratory drilling rights in undersea natural gas fields in the East China Sea. In November 2004, the Japanese detected a Chinese nuclear submarine in their territorial waters. The government publication Defense of Japan 2005 identified China’s military modernization as potentially threatening and called on Beijing to make its defense programs more transparent.
Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines for fiscal year 2005 reaffirmed the traditional SDF role of defending against invasions of Japan’s offshore islands and intrusions into Japanese airspace and territorial waters. The Guidelines also recommended that the SDF improve its ability to respond to new threats such as attacks involving ballistic missiles, guerrillas and special operations forces. Furthermore, they called for enhancing the SDF’s capacity to forestall possible disasters involving nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological materials. To respond to these new challenges, the SDF has been seeking to substitute quality for quantity throughout its ranks, especially in the reserves. For example, the government has raised entry standards for new reserve recruits to attract fewer inexperienced reservists and more SDF veterans.
The SDF consists of a ground, maritime, and air service. The Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is the largest of the three services, totaling some 148,300 personnel in early 2007. The Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) currently numbers 44,500 personnel. The Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) has approximately 45,900 troops. The Central Staff amounts to 1,700 personnel.
The combined strength of the SDF reserve components amounts to 41,800—33,800
in the GSDF Ready Reserve, 1,000 in the Navy Reserve, and 800 in the Air Reserve. In order to differentiate among reservists with varying functions, skills, and experience levels, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) breaks down Japanese reserve components into three categories: Regular Reserves (normally called “Reserve Personnel”), High-Readiness Reserves (normally “Ready Reserve Personnel”), and Reserve Candidates (normally “Candidates for SDF Reserve Personnel”).
Regular Reserves are part-time SDF personnel— normally engaged in full-time employment or study— that perform mainly administrative, logistical, and other support functions. In times of war or emergency, they can substitute for active-duty units engaged in frontline operations by assuming responsibility for reararea security and logistical support. Regular Reserves volunteer for a renewable 3-year term of service and normally train only 5 days each year. Its members typically have at least 1 year of active duty experience or have graduated from “candidate” status.
High-Readiness Reserves consist of selected Regular Reserves in GSDF and recently retired GSDF members who agree to rejoin pre-designated GSDF units during an emergency. High-Readiness Reserves report for 30 days of training annually for a minimum of 3 years. Since they receive more extensive training than Regular Reserves, the JDA considers them most qualified to join front-line active-duty units in combat operations as well as in homeland security missions. The latter can include responding to both natural disasters and accidents (e.g., at one of Japan’s civilian nuclear power facilities). Training programs for High-Readiness Reserves are held on a number of separate occasions throughout the year to accommodate reservists’ civilian schedules.
The JDA created the category of Reserve Candidates in 2001. The aim was to
broaden the range of potential military recruits, increase contacts between the Japanese military and society, and enhance the SDF’s access to utilize professional and technical skills found primarily in the civilian economy. Reserve Candidates are not required to have served as regular SDF personnel, and few have prior military experience. They are also not liable to mobilization orders—only training call-ups.
The SDF divides Reserve Candidates into two subcategories: general and technical candidates. General candidates perform support functions such as reararea security. After 50 days of training over the course of 3 years, they graduate into the Regular Reserves, with the same rights and duties as other members. Technical candidates fill specialized positions such as medical personnel, language experts, computer experts, architects, and vehicle maintenance personnel. After the successful completion of 10 days of training in 2 years, the technical candidates advance into the Regular Reserves.
The salary for each category of reserves differs substantially. Regular Reserves receive 88,500 yen (U.S. $750) each year, consisting of 8,100 yen ($70) for each day of service and an additional 4,000 ($34) yen monthly allowance. Reserve Candidates receive 7,900 yen ($67) per day of education as well as allowances for training call-ups. Compensation for High-Readiness
Reserves depends on the ranks and experience of each individual soldier. On average, a High-Readiness reservist receives approximately 600,000 yen ($5,100) annually in personnel allowances, training call-up allowances, and a continuous service incentive for those who satisfactorily complete their 3-year service commitment.
These monetary incentives have proved most attractive to Reserve Candidates. Since people with no prior military experience can become Reserve Candidates, university students often join to supplement their incomes. In contrast, Japanese recruiters have found it more difficult to attract High-Readiness Reserves. One reason is that Japanese companies, facing shortages of skilled labor, discourage experienced former soldiers from committing to 30 days of annual training in the reserves. Although the government now offers an annual subsidy of 500,000 yen ($4,250) per person to employers of active High- Readiness reservists, JDA officials still complain that private employers discourage their best employees from entering the military. A Japanese executive reportedly told a JDA official that, “We must protect our company before we protect the nation.” Lingering anti-militarism also diminishes the attractiveness of reserve or other military service. Conversely, so does the lack of opportunities for operational experience for those Japanese desiring to participate in either peacekeeping missions or in combat scenarios. Until now, the SDF has never called up its reserve components except for training purposes.
The transformation of the SDF’s reserve components could facilitate Japanese participation in U.S.-led security missions in the Asia-Pacific region. In particular, reservists could apply their civilian skills to joint post-conflict reconstruction operations and humanitarian missions such as the December 2004 Asian Tsunami relief and recovery effort. Surveys show overwhelming public support for SDF participation in disaster-relief activities both within Japan and overseas.237 SDF reservists could apply many of the skills they develop for responding to natural disasters toward managing the consequences of terrorist attacks or human-made accidents. Japanese reservists could also support maritime security and missile defense missions in the regions surrounding Japan. Even though their engagement in actual combat operations is unlikely, their involvement would free up American troops for other roles.238 To make such operations more effective, however, U.S. and Japanese defense planners should expand the involvement of their reserve components in joint military exercises and bilateral dialogue on potential East Asian security contingencies. Establishing additional mechanisms to exchange information on reserve issues— including lessons learned, best practices, and future transformation plans—could also prove profitable.
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