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The End of the Indian Ocean Antiterrorism Mission
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by Alex Calvo
3/18/2010
The witdrawal of the Japanese vessels from the counter-piracy mission and its consequences are the theme of this article by Alex Calvo.
The expiry of the law authorizing the mission has resulted in the withdrawal
of Japanese combat vessels from the Indian Ocean. While in accordance with the DPJ Manifesto and putting an end to a long controversy, it may result in greater Chinese influence along the sea lanes critical to Japanese national security.
This Newsletter summarizes the last days of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean and the political and the strategic debate surrounding the withdrawal.
The Expiry of the Authorizing Law
On 15 January the annual law authorizing the MSDF antiterrorist mission in the Indian Ocean expired. The Democratic Party of Japan had made its views opposing the mission clear on countless occasions before coming to power last September, and despite some rumblings to the contrary, they refused to renew it once in office.
On that same date the law expired, the last refueling was conducted, and the two MSDF vessels then deployed in the Indian Ocean started their voyage back home. The two warships were:
Izakuchi, a 4,550-ton destroyer
Mashu, a 13,500-ton supply ship
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s decision not to extend the Japanese presence in the Indian Ocean was, however, framed so as not to give the impression that:
1) The SDF were not being appreciated
2)Japan would no longer be playing a role in the fight against international terrorism
3)Tokyo would no longer contribute to allied efforts in Afghanistan
This was clear in a number of statements in the days immediately prior to, and following, the withdrawal. For example, on the same day the law expired, Hatoyama issued a statement expressing “heartfelt respect and gratitude to the Self-Defense Forces personnel who have carried out the mission” and saying “[Japan] will continue to contribute actively to the international community’s efforts to combat terrorism.”
Concerning the ultimate reasons for the decision, the new administration also tried to limit any controversy, stressing the fact that demand for fuel had been falling, and arguing this meant the Japanese presence in the Indian Ocean was no longer vital. At a press conference that day, defense minister Kitazawa explained this, saying, “Demand [for refueling] had fallen, so I feel the mission was drawing to its close.”
The overall strategy was to present the end of the mission as—to a large extent—a result of changing circumstances, rather than a radical departure from the policies of previous administrations. Linked to this, it was announced together with the decision to increase financial support to Afghanistan, with a package amounting to up to US$5 billion dollars in civilian aid over a five-year period.
This increased support has been lauded by a number of observers, among them the Asahi Shinbun, which has stated, “We think that’s a reasonable decision.”
Return of the Ships to Japan
The Izakuchi and the Mashu reached Japanese shores on 6 February, arriving at Harumi Wharf, in Tokyo Bay.
Once more, both Prime Minister Hatoyama and Defense Minister Kitazawa were quick to praise the capabilities of the MSDF and their performance in the Indian Ocean.
Hatoyama was present when the vessels arrived, and in his speech told MSDF personnel, “Your strong-looking, proud faces tell that you have completed the mission superbly despite severe conditions.” He also stated that the experience from the refueling operations “will certainly serve Japan’s future foreign and security policies.” He praised Japanese sailors, saying that, “Our personnel showed maritime forces from other countries our superb operational abilities. Your logistic support was also outstanding,” and adding, “As prime minister, I’m extremely proud of your professionalism as SDF and Defense Ministry members.”
Thus, as noted, in spite of marking a departure from the policy of previous administrations, Hatoyama made an effort not to portray the end of the mission as a wholesale break with the past, but rather as resulting from changed circumstances and contributing to Japanese naval capabilities.
The Prime Minister also stressed that, “The government plans to appropriately play its role in national defense, UN peacekeeping operations, and antiterrorism activities.”
The ceremony, attended by about 340 MSDF personnel, also featured Defense Minister Kitazawa and Captain Ryo Sakai, commander of the unit tasked with refueling.
Kitazawa said the MSDF’s “advanced technologies and capabilities constitute a truly valuable asset for our country, which is eager to make an important contribution to the peace and stability of the international community.”
Sakai said the taskforce “managed to achieve results in wide-ranging activities that serve national interests, such as antiterrorism operations and securing the safety of maritime traffic.”
Short Overview of the Mission
Launched in December 2001, the operation was the first occasion on which SDF units were deployed to a military theater, although not on the actual battlefield. This, of course, ran the risk of running counter to Japan’s constitution, which has often been subject to “reinterpretation” by successive governments.
The Koizumi administration, which introduced the first antiterrorism law authorizing it, created a new legal concept called “non-combat areas” in order to avoid a direct clash with Article 9. The government argued that this constitutional provision did not prevent the SDF from providing logistic support in such areas.
Not everybody agreed, as an 18 January report by the Asahi Shinbun reminded its readers. The report considered this interpretation “debatable” and noted it had also been employed “by the Koizumi administration to send SDF troops to Iraq for humanitarian activities.”
The newspaper also referred to other controversial aspects of the mission, namely the 2007 “allegations that the fuel had been used by US vessels taking part in the Iraq War,” the revelation that “that the government’s report to the Diet on the mission contained incorrect information about the amount of fuel provided” and an attempt to “cover up the error.”
These allegations were also mentioned in an undated entry in the Social Democratic Party’s website, welcoming “the end of refueling activities in the Indian Ocean.” The SDP, a junior partner in the current government, has been a consistent opponent of the mission.
The original legislation was in force for two years, and subsequently extended on three occasions. In July 2007, opposition parties, including the Democratic Party of Japan, gained a majority in the upper house and were able to block a renewal of the mission. The mission was suspended, but, in January 2008, the government headed by Yasuo Fukuda used a constitutional provision allowing legislation to be passed by a two-thirds majority in the lower house to force its resumption, and in February the MSDF were back in the line of duty.
From the launch of the mission to the end of 2009, Ministry of Defense records show the MSDF have:
1)Supplied about 510,000 kiloliters of fuel to warships from twelve countries, including the US, France, Britain and Pakistan. The number of refuelings amounts to 938
2)Provided some 1,200 kiloliters of fuel for helicopters on these warships on 85 occasions
3)Given some 11,000 tons of water on 194 occasions
The total cost of the fuel has been more than US$260 million.
Although the operation, with its short interruption, has been in place since late 2001, its tempo has slackened over time. More than half the total fuel provided was supplied in the sixteen-month period up to March 2003, when the US Navy was heavily engaged in air-support missions over Afghanistan.
By contrast, only about 27,000 kiloliters were supplied from February 2008 to the end of the mission, with the monthly number of ships being refueled dropping to just five or seven in the last few months.
As explained above, this decreasing demand for fuel has been used by the Hatoyama administration as a justification for the decision not to renew the mission, a stand judged “reasonable” by the Japan Times.
In spite of the diminishing intensity of the mission over time, some MSDF members spent long periods of time at sea. The Mainichi Shinbun, commenting on the non-renewal of the law, reminded readers that “the activities placed a high strain on MSDF members, some of whom were sent overseas as many as seven times with each mission lasting four to five months.”
Both the positive contribution of the mission to Japan’s national security and standing in the world, and the efforts of MSDF personnel, were stressed in an entry in Masahisa Sato’s blog dated 5 February. The author claimed “Japan is proud of you,” and reminded readers that the MSDF’s presence in the Indian Ocean is not over since they have been deployed to “deal with pirates.”
The Wider Context
In spite of the controversy surrounding the mission and the long-standing opposition by the DPJ, currently in power, and some minor parties, a number of observers have expressed their concern about the impact of the end of the Japanese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. These fears include:
1) Loss of access to intelligence on maritime terrorism
2)A return to the much criticized “check book diplomacy”
3) A negative impact on relations with the United States
4)Facilitating an increase in the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean
The last two points will be covered in separate chapters of this Newsletter.
Concerning access to intelligence, the MSDF presence in the Indian Ocean as well as its participation in counter-piracy operations off Somalia involved the secondment of personnel to the US Central Command in Tampa, Florida and the Multinational Naval Force headquarters in Bahrain.
As the Mainichi Shinbun noted on 16 January, “Japan’s withdrawal from the refueling mission means that some of the liaison officers will have to return to Japan, and concerns have been voiced within the Ministry of Defense that access to information vital for Japan’s security will drop markedly as a result of the move.”
A former MSDF chief of staff, speaking anonymously to the Mainichi Shinbun, claimed that, “There is a possibility that terrorist information could become harder to come by and it will be a big loss in terms of Japan’s national interests.”
With regard to Japan’s participation in the international community, the mission was seen by some as useful since it allowed Japan to claim it was contributing to allied efforts in Afghanistan, while avoiding any commitment likely to result in involvement in combat or personnel losses. As noted in the same report by the Mainichi Shinbun, refueling was seen by the MSDF, “whose activities face many restrictions,” as a “low-risk, high-return” venture that would be “highly valued by international society.”
The mission will be replaced, in the eyes of the government, by an increased volume of civilian aid to Kabul. However this is not seen as a proper compensation by all observers.
The current main opposition party, the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party, harshly criticized the decision in a statement which branded the possible results in terms of the country’s image as “extremely negative.” The statement also said the mission had “received high praise from many countries” and claimed that it also contributed to “the protection of important sea lanes between Japan and the Middle East” and therefore was in “the national interest of Japan itself,” adding that “given the cost” it was “cost-effective.”
The Impact on US-Japan Relations
The Japanese withdrawal was met, at least publicly, with calm by Washington.
Asked about the decision by reporters on its last day, US State Department spokesman Philip Crowley simply said, “This was a decision that Japan made,” while adding that Tokyo “continues to make important contributions to the mission in Afghanistan,” in reference to the planned increase in civilian aid to the country.
The non-renewal of the law comes at a time when other issues, including the relocation of Futenma, are placing a strain on relations between Washington and Tokyo. However the real impact of the withdrawal should not be exaggerated since, as noted, the amount of refuelings has markedly decreased over time, and it is likely that the United States decided not to spend valuable political capital trying to keep the mission alive.
The Chinese Position
An aspect of the withdrawal which has attracted the attention of some observers in Japan is the possibility that the void left by the MSDF in the Indian Ocean may be filled by a resurgent China.
Chief among them the conservative newspaper Sankei Shinbun, which a few days before the end of the mission warned that, according to “several government sources,” the Chinese Navy was “considering taking over the refueling operations of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces.”
The Sankei Shinbun reminded readers that Japan “relies on the Middle East for 90% of its crude oil imports” and that, as a result of the withdrawal, she would “not only lose its presence in the sea lane in that area, but the very foundation of its energy policy will also be under China’s control.”
China is already a participant in counter-piracy operations off Somalia, having dispatched two destroyers and a supply ship to the area. According to an unnamed defense official quoted by the Sankei, “the Chinese supply vessel has become quite proficient” and the ship may take over refueling operations.
However, as the report notes, there are two major obstacles to such development: It is unlikely that China would place her forces under US military command; and the technical standards of China’s supply vessels differ from those of the vessels to be refueled.
The perceived benefits to China of such a decision are said to include:
1)Access to information from other participating nations
2)Expanding its role in the defense of Indian Ocean sea lanes
3)Driving a wedge between Japan and the US. (An unnamed source is quoted as saying that “it is possible that China may announce its participation in OEF in order to highlight US-China rapprochement.”)
The possible Chinese replacement of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean has not been announced at the time of writing and seems unlikely. However, fears that a growing People’s Liberation Army Navy might welcome Japan’s decision may well be not far off the mark.
Another Japanese daily, the Yomiuri Shinbun, in some ways went further than the Sankei, claiming that the possibility that China might replace Japan had already been considered when the refueling mission was temporarily suspended in late 2007. According to the Yomiuri, “a party connected to the Chinese Navy unofficially sounded out US government on taking over the mission. However, the United States did not accept the proposal at that time.”
The Yomiuri quotes unnamed Japanese officials as stating that, “From the perspective of achieving energy security, China aims at stabilizing the route to procure oil from the Middle East.”
Postscript: The Reconstruction of Haiti
Whether by chance or design, the return of the Izakuchi and the Mashu coincided with the departure of the first batch of Japanese troops bound for Haiti.
The 350-strong SDF contingent will join the UN peacekeeping mission in that country, in what is the first such mission under the Hatoyama administration. Comprising engineers and logistical support personnel, the contingent is expected to help repair roads, remove rubble, and build shelters for the victims of the earthquake.
Although at least partly meant to show that Japan is not withdrawing from the international arena, the deployment of this contingent is fundamentally different from the MSDF antiterrorism mission in the Indian Ocean. Earthquakes in Haiti, however painful from a humanitarian perspective, pose no threat to Japan’s (nor, to be honest, to any other country’s) national security, whereas sea lines of communication are essential to the survival of an island nation, a fact not denied even by the strongest opponents of the mission.
Alex Calvo serves as Professor of International Relations and International Law, European University in Barcelona (Spain)
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